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Agents compete to acquire a limited economic opportunity of uncertain pro￿tability.
Each agent decides how much he acquires public signals before making investment
under fear of preemption. I show that equilibria have various levels of e¢ ciency under
mild competition. The e⁄ect of competition on the equilibrium strategy is di⁄erent
depending on which class of equilibrium we focus on. However, when competitive
pressure is su¢ ciently high, there exists a unique equilibrium. Finally, I show that
the e⁄ect of competition on e¢ ciency is di⁄erent between the common value and the
private value setting. Strong competition leads to the least e¢ cient equilibrium for
the common value setting but e¢ ciency can be improved by competition in the private
value setting.
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There are many economic situations where agents have to decide how much to wait to receive
more information under a time pressure. For example, consider a ￿rm￿ s entry problem. The
￿rm can receive more information about the pro￿tability of the market if he delays the timing
of the entry. On the other hand, when the ￿rm delays the entry too much, the market might
be less pro￿table after having too many entries by other ￿rms. Another example is a clearance
sale. If consumers wait until the ￿nal day of the sale, they may receive more information
about new alternative products. On the other hand, the product might be sold out if the
consumers wait until the ￿nal day of the sale.
This paper investigates a preemption game in which each agent decides how much to
acquire public information before investment under fear of preemption. Especially, I compare
the e⁄ect of competition in two cases: the investment opportunity has (i) common value,
(ii) private value. I show that even though the e⁄ect of competition on the equilibrium
strategy is similar for both cases, the e⁄ect of competition on e¢ ciency can be quite di⁄erent.
Concretely, in both cases, strong competition discourages information acquisition and induces
a quicker decision making. In the common value setting, the quicker decision leads to the
least e¢ cient equilibrium. However, in the private value setting, the quicker decision can
improve e¢ ciency through allocation of opportunities. That is, opportunities tend to be
obtained by agents who value opportunities higher, i.e. there is a sorting e⁄ect.
In Section 2, I introduce the game. I employ a discrete time framework to analyze the
preemption problem in which opportunities have common value. Section 3 provides the equi-
librium analysis. The key parameter of the model is the competition level, which is measured
by the ratio between the number of agents and the number of opportunities. Since the equi-
librium investment strategy determines the level of information utilization, our interest is in
the relationship between the level of competition and the information e¢ ciency of the set of
equilibria. First, I introduce a class of strategies with an important property which is called
myopia. Myopic strategies "invest" whenever the expected pro￿t from immediate investment
is strictly positive and "wait" whenever the expected payo⁄ from immediate investment is
negative. I show a myopic equilibrium exists for any competition level. Importantly, the
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I analyze the other possible equilibria under mild and strong competition levels. I show
that equilibria with "forward looking behavior," that is, where agents wait even though the
expected payo⁄is positive, exist under mild competition. Moreover, there is a wide range of
equilibrium outcomes from the least e¢ cient to the ￿rst best under mild competition. How-
ever, under strong competition, the set of equilibria loses its variety. That is, all equilibria
are myopic. Moreover, I show that the e⁄ect of competition on the equilibrium strategy de-
pends on the class of equilibrium we focus on. For example, if we focus on symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium, competition can increase the probability of waiting in equilibrium. On
the other hand, competition discourages waiting if we focus on the pure strategy symmetric
equilibrium.
In Section 4, I analyze the case where the value of opportunities for each agent depends
on private information, e.g., technology or willingness to pay. First, I show that all equilibria
are monotonic in the sense that whenever one type invests with positive probability, "more
pro￿table" type also invests. However, unlike the common value setting, myopic equilibrium
does not always exist. Second, the e⁄ect of competition in equilibrium strategy is similar
to that in the common value case. That is, equilibria with full use of information can exist
under mild competition but not for su¢ ciently strong competition. In fact, the myopic
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium when competition is su¢ ciently strong. The e⁄ect of
competition can improve e¢ ciency through better allocation of opportunities. That is, the
myopic equilibrium implies that the higher pro￿tability type has a greater chance to get the
investment opportunity. I provide a su¢ cient condition in which the net e⁄ect of competition
is positive.
Related literature
Unlike the usual preemption games, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), Hoppe and
Lehmann-Grube (2005), information acquisition is the key element of this model. Thus, this
paper is close to strategic real option models which study the timing of investment under
uncertain pro￿tability and fear of preemption. Grenadier (2002) analyzes an oligopoly game
in which each ￿rm chooses when to increase the production level when facing uncertainty.
Especially, he shows that the option premium is monotonically decreasing in competition and
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winner-take-all preemption game with incomplete information, which is closer to my model.
Especially, Anderson et al (2009) analyzes a N-player game and shown how the threshold
value of the equilibrium trigger strategy changes with respect to the level of competition.
There are several key di⁄erences between my model and others. In my model, the degree
of competition is de￿ned as the ratio between the number of opportunities and the number
of competitors. In Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) and Anderson et al (2010), the game
has one opportunity and the game immediately ￿nishes after the opportunity is taken. On
the other hand, in my model, the game continues after one opportunity is taken and thus the
history of actions can play a key role. To analyze the e⁄ect of competition more generally,
I employ a discrete time framework and allow all behavioral strategies given a history of
public signals and actions. The richer preemption structure and the strategy space make
it possible to provide more insights into the e⁄ect of competition. I show that the e⁄ect
of competition on the equilibrium strategy depends on which class of strategy we focus on.
For example, when I focus on symmetric mixed strategy, competition can make agents more
"forward looking" in some range of competition. On the other hand, if we focus on pure
strategy symmetric equilibria, competition discourages "forward looking" behaviors. Thus,
my model re￿nes understanding about the e⁄ect of competition on equilibrium strategies.
Finally, unlike Grenadier (2002) and Anderson et al (2010) which focus on the e⁄ect of
competition on the option premium and the threshold value of the trigger strategy, my paper
also analyzes the e⁄ect of competition on e¢ ciency. I show that even though the e⁄ect of
competition on the equilibrium strategy is similar between the common value and the private
value setting, the e⁄ect of competition on e¢ ciency can be quite di⁄erent. That is, strong
competition decreases e¢ ciency in the common value setting but e¢ ciency can be improved
by strong competition in the private value setting.
2 The model
Basics. There are K ￿ 1 identical investment opportunities. Let I = f1;2;::;Ig be the set
of agents: In each period, each agent chooses either ai = B; "invest/buy" or ai = W; "wait".
Thus, the set of actions is Ai = fB;Wg: Let S = ￿N
n=1Sn be the ￿nite set of states of the
3
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v : S ! R: Finally, f(s) is the probability distribution over S which is common knowledge.
For simplicity, I assume the following.
Assumption 1. There exists s;s0 2 S such that v(s) > 0; v(s0) < 0:
Assumption 2. supp(f) = S:
Time is discrete, n = 1;2;:::N. Given state s = (s1;s2;::;sN); agents observe signal sn
at period n: That is, agents face a sequence of public signals (s1;s2;::;sN). Then, processed
signals at n given state s is denoted by sn; which is the projection of s on ￿n
n0=1Sn0: Thus, if
the agent waits until period N; he can make a decision based on s. For simplicity, I assume
no agent discounts the future payo⁄.1
Assumption 3. For any sn;
P
s v(s)f(sjsn) 6= 0:
This assumption is for simplicity. Note that, when the model has sn such that
P
s v(s)f(sjsn) =
0; Assumption 3 can be always satis￿ed by perturbing the model slightly.
Preemption game. In the beginning of each period, agents observe a public signal and
a history of investments. Then, the agents who have not previously invested simultaneously
choose actions. When the number of agents who choose B is less than the number of
investment opportunities in the period, each agent who chose B gets an opportunity. When
the number of agents who choose B is larger than the number of available opportunities in
the period, the investment opportunities are allocated by a fair lottery. More preciously, let
xn be the total number of investors who decide to invest in period n; i.e., #fj 2 Ijajn = Bg;
and xn￿1 denote the total number of opportunities taken by agents by period n ￿ 1: Then,






ends when all K opportunities are taken or at the end of period N; whichever comes ￿rst.
When the agent play W until the game ends, his payo⁄ is 0.
Strategy and Equilibrium. Let H
n￿1
i ￿ Ai
n￿1 be the set of possible histories of i0s actions,
h
n￿1
i = (ai1;ai2;::;ain￿1). Each history of actions has the properties that (i) h
n￿1
i = ? if
1It is easy to modify the results with impatient agents. Moreover, all results are preserved when all agents
are su¢ ciently patient.
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n￿1
i includes at most one ai = B: Let Hn￿1 ￿ ￿iH
n￿1
i denote the set of
possible h
n￿1
i of all agents at n: Hn￿1 has the property that the number of B in hn￿1 is
at most K: Moreover, let ￿(Ai) be the set of probability distributions over Ai. Then, a
behavioral strategy of agent i is a mapping from set of histories to the set of distributions







such that ￿i(sn;hn￿1)(B) = 0 if h
n￿1
i includes ain0 = B for some n0 < n: The behavioral
strategy is nondegenerate if ￿i(sn;hn￿1)(B) 2 (0;1) for some histories.
The game is analyzed using the concept of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE). Formally,
let ui(￿i;￿￿ijsn;hn￿1) be the expected utility when agent i chooses ￿i and the other agents
￿i choose ￿￿i at a history (sn;hn￿1). Then, ￿￿ = (￿i
￿)i2I is subgame perfect equilibrium if,















for every strategy ￿i:











￿(s) is the allocation rule that is determined by the outcome of the game given
strategy pro￿le ￿ and state s, i.e., ￿i
￿(s) = 1 if agent i gets an investment opportunity at s
and ￿i
￿(s) = 0 otherwise.
3 The equilibrium analysis
Before starting the analysis, I provide an important observation about the role of competi-
tion.
Observation 1. Equilibrium always has the highest possible e¢ ciency level if there is
no competition, i.e., I ￿ K:
5
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invest, he gets the opportunity with probability 1. Thus, each agent waits until period N.
As a result, the decision is based on the sign of v(s) so the allocation is e¢ cient. Thus, the
interesting case of the model is with competition. Henceforth, I focus on the case I > K:
Now, turning to the main analysis, I introduce a class of strategies which plays a crucial
role in this analysis.







1 whenever E[v(s)jsn] > 0
0 whenever E[v(s)jsn] < 0:
Moreover, an equilibrium is myopic equilibrium if all agents play myopic strategy in the
equilibrium.
In short, under this strategy, the agent invests whenever the expected payo⁄ from the
immediate investment is positive.
Let ￿myo be the myopic strategy pro￿le and ￿￿(K;I) be the set of all equilibria given
(K;I). The next proposition claims that myopic equilibrium always exists and this is always
least e¢ cient equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Myopic equilibrium always exists for any I > K. Moreover, V (￿myo) ￿
V (￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿￿(K;I):
Proof. Consider any history (sn;hn￿1) in which E[v(s)jsn] > 0: Then, the expected
payo⁄ from the myopic strategy, i.e., ain = B; is K￿xn￿1
I￿xn￿1 E[v(s)jsn] > 0: Suppose an agent
deviates to ain = W: Since I > K; the game is terminated at n. This means the payo⁄ from
this deviation is zero, so there is no incentive to deviate: On the other hand, consider any
history (sn;hn￿1) in which E[v(s)jsn] < 0: Obviously, the payo⁄ from the myopic strategy,
i.e., ain = W; is at least 0: On the other hand, the deviation to ain = B yields weakly
negative pro￿t. Thus, again, the deviation is not pro￿table.
For the last part of the proposition, suppose ￿0;￿00 2 ￿￿(K;I) in which, for any i;
￿00
i(sn;hn￿1)(B) ￿ ￿0
i(sn;hn￿1)(B) for all (sn;hn￿1) and the inequality is strict for some
6
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that with ￿00 given s: Then, since ￿0;￿00 2 ￿￿(K;I) and no one invest when the expected
payo⁄ is negative, V (￿0) ￿ V (￿00):
Now, suppose V (￿myo) > V (￿) for ￿ 2 ￿￿(K;I): Then, there must be some agents and
some states in which investment under ￿ is earlier than under myopic strategies. Hence,
some agents choose ai = B for some histories in which sn satis￿es E[v(s)jsn] < 0: But
such a strategy cannot be optimal given sn since the expected payo⁄from W is always non
negative. A contradiction. Q.E.D.
An intuition of Proposition is simple. For the existence, note that when all agents follow
myopic strategy and they invest at the current period, no opportunity is left in the next
period. Thus, the deviation cannot be pro￿table. For the second part, observe that, in
any equilibrium, no one invests at any history where the expected payo⁄ is negative. Thus,
in any other equilibria, the game ends at later period than myopic equilibrium and more
information is utilized.
3.1 Mild Competition
Our next question is whether the game has more e¢ cient equilibria than myopic. Thus, I
introduce a class of strategy with "forward looking behavior," i.e., choosing W at a history
in which the expected payo⁄ from the immediate investment is strictly positive.
De￿nition 2. A strategy ￿i(sn;hn￿1) is forward looking (FL) if
(i) ￿i(sn;hn￿1)(B) = 0 if sn is such that E[v(s)jsn] < 0;
(ii) ￿i(sn;hn￿1)(B) < 1 for some (sn;hn￿1) in which sn is such that E[v(s)jsn] > 0.
Moreover, an equilibrium is FL equilibrium if some agents play FL strategies in the equi-
librium.2
Thus, when an agent plays a forward looking strategy, the agent may not invest even
though immediate investment yields a strictly positive expected payo⁄. That is, the agent
shows "forward looking behavior" for some sn such that E[v(s)jsn] > 0: Obviously, FL
2FL equilibrium can be asymmetric equilibrium.
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information e¢ ciency.
Now, the question is under which conditions FL equilibria exist.
Proposition 2. Suppose there exists ^ s 2 S such that v(^ s) < 0 and there exists n￿
such that E[v(s)jsn￿(^ s)] > 0: Then, for su¢ ciently small I=K > 1; there always exists a FL
equilibrium which exhibits the forward looking behavior in period n￿ 2 f1;2;::;Ng in state
^ s:
In short, under weak competition, the existence of forward looking equilibria is guaranteed
whenever there are signals which imply positive expected payo⁄s at period n < N but it
does not guarantee positive payo⁄s, i.e., strictly positive option value. Thus, there are
many equilibrium outcomes under mild competition from the least e¢ cient to the ￿rst best
outcome.
Proof. The proof is by construction. Consider the following strategy such that agents





> > > <
> > > :
0 for (sn;hn￿1) s.t. E[v(s)jsn] < 0
0 for (sn(^ s);hn￿1) where n ￿ n￿ and hn￿1 is such that xn￿1 = 0
1 Otherwise
9
> > > =
> > > ;
:
I claim there is an equilibrium where all agents follow this strategy.
Notice that except for history (sn(^ s);hn￿1) where xn￿1 = 0 for n ￿ n￿; this strategy is
myopic. Thus, to see whether this strategy constitutes a symmetric equilibrium, it is enough
to check the incentive to deviate at (sn(^ s);hn￿1) where xn￿1 = 0 for n ￿ n￿:
Let 1(sn) be indicator function which equals 1 for any sn such that n > n￿ and E[v(s)jsn] >
0; 0 otherwise. Then, observe that we have an equilibrium only if there is no incentive to
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always exists small K=I > 1 for which these strategies form an equilibrium. The same
argument works for with n < n￿: Q.E.D.
The intuition of this proof is simple. Under mild competition, if there is a chance that
pro￿tability is negative, the bene￿t from information acquisition can be larger than the risk
of losing a potentially pro￿table opportunity. As a result, a forward looking behavior is
possible in equilibrium. The next result is immediate from Proposition 2.
Corollary 1. Suppose, for any sN￿1; there exists sN 2 SN which makes the value of
the opportunity strictly negative. Then, for su¢ ciently small I=K > 1; there exists FL
equilibrium where all agents wait until the last period.
Remark 1. It is important to note that the mild competition is characterized by I=K
rather than I: To see the reason, suppose K = 1: Then, the mildest competition level is
I=K = 2 since competition means K < I: On the other hand, if K = 10, the mildest com-
petition level is 11=10: Thus, when K is small, there is a limitation to how mild competition
can be. In other words, the existence of an FL equilibrium depends on K as well as I:
3.2 Strong Competition
Now we know that, under mild competition, there are many equilibrium outcomes from
the least e¢ cient to the ￿rst best outcome. In this subsection, I focus on equilibria when
competition is strong in the sense that I=K is large. The next result says that, when
competition is su¢ ciently strong, the multiplicity of equilibria vanishes and only the least
e¢ cient equilibrium exists.
Proposition 3. If I=K is su¢ ciently large; all equilibria are myopic.
Proof. See appendix.
The proof is by induction. At the ￿nal period, it is easy to see that the equilibrium
strategy is myopic. Given this fact, we can show that, conditional on reaching stage N ￿ 1;
the expected payo⁄from the immediate investment is higher than that from waiting whenever
9
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su¢ ciently strong. The intuition is the following. Strong competition lowers the probability
of getting a pro￿table opportunity by waiting. As a result, the bene￿t from waiting is
discounted even though waiting improves the accuracy of decision making. It is not hard to
con￿rm the same argument at earlier periods by similar reasoning. Thus, by induction, this
is true for all periods, and agents play myopic strategy.
Next, I analyze how equilibrium forward looking behaviors change as the level of compe-
tition increases. Let ￿￿(I;K) be the set of all equilibria given (I;K) and sn(s) denote the
projection of s on ￿n
n0=1Sn0: Let S(I;K) be the set of states in which some agents exhibit a






0 2 S :
(i) 9￿￿ 2 ￿￿(I;K) such that ￿￿
i(sn(s0);hn￿1)(B) < 1 for some i





The next proposition says that the set of states in which some agents exhibit a forward
looking behavior in some equilibria monotonically shrinks as competition becomes stronger.
Proposition 4. S(I;K) ￿ S(I0;K) for I > I0: Moreover, limI!1 S(I;K) = ;:
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition behind the proof is similar to that for Proposition 3. First of all, we can
show by induction that any forward looking behavior in equilibrium vanishes for su¢ ciently
large I: The more complex part of the proof is to show that if ^ s = 2 S(I;K), then, ^ s = 2 S(I0;K)
for I0 > I: I show if (i) immediate investment has a positive expected payo⁄ (ii) there is no
nondegenerate behavioral strategy equilibrium at any history which includes sn(^ s); then B
always dominates W. Next, I show that if B dominates W, then the dominance is preserved
for larger I: Intuitively, this is because, given the number of other agents choosing B in the
current period, an increase in I does not a⁄ect the payo⁄from B but lowers the payo⁄from
W: Thus, if the dominance of B is established at I; it is preserved for larger I:
Remark 2. Note that Proposition 4 does not imply that e¢ ciency of the most e¢ cient
equilibrium is monotonically decreasing in I given K: However, if we focus on symmetric
10
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 085pure strategy equilibria, the e⁄ect of competition on e¢ ciency is monotonic. To see the
claim, given a symmetric pure strategy FL equilibrium, consider a history in which no one
has not invested. Then, observe that, larger K=I makes the value of waiting higher but
it does not a⁄ect the payo⁄ from immediate investment. Thus, for larger K=I; the FL
behavior can be supported on the equilibrium path. On the other hand, by Proposition 4,
any FL equilibrium vanishes for su¢ ciently small K=I. Hence, e¢ ciency of the most e¢ cient
equilibrium is monotonically decreasing in I given K if we focus on pure strategy symmetric
FL equilibria.
When we focus on the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, e¢ ciency can be improved
by competition in some range. The next example demonstrates the claim.
3.3 Example
Consider a two-period model with one investment opportunity, i.e. N = 2 and K = 1. Let
C(s1) =
P
s2S maxfv(s);0gf(sjs1) be the payo⁄ from W without rationing and D(s1) =
P
s2S v(s)f(sjs1) is the payo⁄ from B without rationing: Henceforth, I suppress s1 from
C(s1) and D(s1) for notational simplicity. Notice that C=D measures the relative value of
the information s2: Suppose s1 is such that D > 0; otherwise the analysis is trivial. Let
qI be the behavioral strategy ￿i(s1;h0)(B) when the number of agents is I: The behavioral

















The condition says the expected payo⁄ from B and the expected payo⁄ from W are same.






























j+1: It is easy to see that G(I;q) is strictly
increasing in q for all I ￿ 2: Moreover, since limq!1 G(I;q) > C
D; there exists a symmetric
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Now, we are interested in the behavior of the equilibrium q with respect to I: That is,
what happens to G(I;q) as I increases.





















































j+1 > 1; G(I + 1;q) ￿ G(I;q) > 0 for all q 2 (0;1): Thus, it is obvious that, for
any I0 < I00 such that I0;I00 < C
D; we have qI
0 < qI00: Hence, for any I1;I2; and I3 such that
I1 < I2 < C
D < I3; we have
qI2 < qI1 < qI3 = 1:
In other words, equilibrium behavior becomes more forward looking as competition in-
creases as long as I < C=D but the strategy jumps to the myopic strategy when I ￿ C=D: In
short, as long as I < C=D; the behavior in the symmetric equilibrium becomes more forward
looking as competition increases.
The next question is whether, in the range I < C=D; larger competition increases the
probability that the game reaches second period and thus utilizes all information. That is,
we want to know the behavior of (1￿qI)I given s1, i.e., probability that the game reaches the




























































































qIC + (1 ￿ qI)D
:
Since C > D; the denominator of the right hand side is strictly increasing in qI: Thus, the
right hand side is strictly decreasing in qI: Hence, for any I1;I2; and I3 such that I1 < I2 <
C
D < I3; we have
0 = (1 ￿ qI3)
I3 < (1 ￿ qI1)
I1 < (1 ￿ qI2)
I2:
Thus, stronger competition improves e¢ ciency as long as the level of competition is in
the range I < C=D.
The intuition behind this result is the following. Larger I decreases the payo⁄ from
waiting since the probability to get the object decreases. On the other hand, mixing is an
equilibrium only if the expected payo⁄ from waiting and investing are the same. Hence,
the probability of immediate investment has to be decreased to balance them: Obviously,
an additional investor with a positive probability of immediate investment increases the
probability of termination of the game at the ￿rst period given this strategy. However, this
e⁄ect is dominated by the new equilibrium randomization which puts a larger probability
on W:
4 Private values
In many cases, pro￿tability depends on the characteristics of the agent. This section analyzes
our model in the private value setting. Let T ￿ R be a ￿nite set of types with typical element
13
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of t and ti is drawn randomly from g(t) for each i: In addition to Assumption 1, 2 and 3, I
assume that (i) t is independent of s (ii) v(s;t) is strictly increasing in t: Then, a behavioral






n￿1) ￿ T ! ￿(Ai):
I analyze the game with the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Since we
are interested in the e⁄ect of competition, I focus on symmetric PBE, i.e., ￿i(sn;hn￿1;ti) =
￿j(sn;hn￿1;tj) if ti = tj:






B for E[v(s;t)jsn;hn￿1] > 0
W forE[v(s;t)jsn;hn￿1] < 0
:
The next observation clari￿es the key di⁄erence between the common value and the
private value setting.
Observation 2. Myopic equilibrium does not always exist.
To see Observation 2, consider s0
1 such that E[v(s0
1;t0))js0
1] > 0: Suppose all agents play


















1]>0g g(t) is small, type t0 prefers
to wait given signal s0
1: Note that, in the common value setting, all agents take the same
action in myopic strategy. Thus, whenever I > K; no opportunity is left after a signal which




1]>0g g(t) is small and I=K is close to 1, the probability that objects are left in
the second period is high. Then, if the vale of information from later periods is su¢ ciently
high, it is pro￿table to deviate from myopic strategy.
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0; we have ￿i(sn;hn￿1;t)(B) > 0: The next proposition says that all equilibria share one
property.
Proposition 5. All equilibria are monotonic.
To provide an intuition, observe that the value of waiting is higher for lower types. This
is because the set of signals in which the payo⁄ becomes negative is larger for lower types
and the level of loss given a state is always higher for lower types. On the other hand, it is
easy to see that the gain from immediate investment is always higher for higher types. Thus,
whenever lower types invest in equilibrium, a higher type always prefers to invest.
Proof. See appendix.
The following proposition says that the e⁄ect of competition on equilibrium is similar to
that in the common value setting.
Proposition 6. If K=I is su¢ ciently small, all equilibria are myopic.
Proof. See appendix.
The proof of this result is similar to that in the common value case.
















￿(s;t) is the allocation rule determined by the game given strategy pro￿le ￿, i.e.,
￿i
￿(s) = 1 if agent i gets an investment opportunity in state s and ￿i
￿(s) = 0; if the agent
does not gets an opportunity:
Let ￿myo denote myopic strategy pro￿le.
Observation 3. If maxt;t0 jv(s;t) ￿ v(s;t0)j is su¢ ciently small for any s; V (￿myo) ￿
V (￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿￿:
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ting. This implies that if technological di⁄erence among ￿rms or willingness to pay among
consumers are small enough, the e⁄ect of competition is always negative.
The rest of this section investigates the positive e⁄ect of competition. In order to in-
troduce a benchmark e¢ ciency level, let ￿full be the strategy pro￿le such that, for all i;






B for E[v(s;t)jsN;hN￿1] > 0
W forE[v(s;t)jsN;hN￿1] < 0
:
Moreover, let S1;t = fs1jE[v(s;t)js1] ￿ 0g; St = fsjv(s;t) ￿ 0g; and ^ St = fs 2 Stjs1(s) 2
S1;tg where s1(s) is the projection of s on S1: Thus, if ^ St = St; s1(s) perfectly reveals the
pro￿tability in state s. Finally, let (TL;TH) be a partition of set T where t 2 TL implies
t < t0 for all t0 2 TH:
The next proposition provides a su¢ cient condition in which competition improves e¢ -
ciency.









s2Stn^ St f(s) are su¢ ciently small and I=K is su¢ ciently large, then V (￿full) <
V (￿myo):
Proof. See appendix.
To provide an intuition, suppose there are two types, L and H: When I=K is su¢ ciently
large, all agents play myopic strategy. Then, when type H ￿nds the opportunity pro￿table at
period 1 but type L does not, all opportunities are taken at the ￿rst period by type H as I=K
goes to in￿nity. On the other hand, when all agents wait until the ￿nal period, the probability
that type L gets opportunities become positive . Thus, opportunities are allocated to more
pro￿table agents under strong competition. This sorting e⁄ects can dominates the negative
e⁄ect of competition when s1 is very "informative" signal for type H: This is because when
the optimal decision based on s1 is consistent with the optimal decision based on s with
higher probability, ine¢ ciency from the quicker decision making becomes smaller.
16
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This model can also be interpreted as a model of bounded rationality where agents have
a limited information processing capacity, e.g., Lipman (1995), Rubinstein (1998), Dow
(1991). Suppose each agent needs "time to think" to obtain the logical implication, e.g., the
computation result, given available information. Then, we can interpret sn as the result of
computation based on sn￿1: Thus, all agents face a sequence of public signals, s1;s2;::;sN:
In this formulation, the agent can make a decision based on all the implications of the initial
data as long as he spends a su¢ cient time. On the other hand, the decision must be based
only on coarse information in order to make a quicker decision. Thus, this model can be less
ad-hoc than models whose coarseness of perception is ￿xed under any situations.
The prediction of this model is consistent with experimental observations in cognitive
science. Experiments show that decision making changes qualitatively under "time pressure."
In other words, the way to process information is determined by "economic situation" rather
than being ￿xed. For example, agents are more likely to ignore some information and make
decisions based only on cues. Then, when an agent faces a decision problem under time
pressure, he tends to make a decision based on coarser information, e.g., Svenson and Maule
(1993).
6 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the e⁄ect of competition in a preemption game under uncertainty.
The following summarizes the basic results.
In the common value setting,
1. The game always has a myopic equilibrium which is the least e¢ cient equilibrium.
2. The game has multiple equilibria with a wide range of e¢ ciency levels under mild
competition.
3. All equilibria are myopic under strong competition. Thus, competition causes a dete-
rioration of e¢ ciency.
In the private value setting,
17
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2. Under strong competition, all equilibria are myopic.
3. Because of the sorting e⁄ect, competition can improve e¢ ciency in some cases.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 3 and 4
First, I prove Proposition 3 by establishing the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Fix any ^ s 2 S(I;K): Then, ^ s = 2 S(I0;K) for su¢ ciently large I0:
Proof. First, I show that if I is su¢ ciently large, the equilibrium strategy at N ￿1 must
be myopic. Then, I prove that whenever the equilibrium strategies for periods after N ￿ m
are myopic, the equilibrium strategy at N ￿ m is myopic as well if I is su¢ ciently large.
It is obvious that, for all I; agents must play a myopic strategy at n = N. So, consider
period N ￿ 1: If the game continues to this period, we must have K ￿ xN￿2 > 0: Let
xN￿1 be #fj 2 IjajN￿1 = Bg and ^ sN￿1 be the projection of ^ s on ￿
N￿1
n0=1Sn0: Then, de￿ne











Thus, if E[v(s)j^ sN￿1] > 0; the choice B brings a strictly positive expected payo⁄ for any
xN￿1 2 f0;1;::;I ￿ xN￿2 ￿ 1g :
Since we know that each agent plays a myopic strategy in the next period, the expected








K ￿ xN￿2 ￿ xN￿1





Notice that W yields 0 if xN￿1 ￿ K ￿ xN￿2 and a strictly positive payo⁄ for xN￿1 <
K ￿ xN￿2: Hence
U(BjxN￿1; ^ s
N￿1;x
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Obviously, U(BjxN￿1; ^ sN￿1;xN￿2) does not depend on I: On the other hand, U(WjxN￿1; ^ sN￿1;xN￿2)
is strictly decreasing in I when xN￿1 < K ￿ xN￿2: Thus, for su¢ ciently large I;
U(BjxN￿1; ^ s
N￿1;x
N￿2) > U(WjxN￿1; ^ s
N￿1;x
N￿2)
for xN￿1 < K ￿ xN￿2: Hence, U(BjxN￿1; ^ sN￿1;xN￿2) > U(WjxN￿1; ^ sN￿1;xN￿2) for all
xN￿1 2 f0;1;::;X ￿ xN￿2 ￿ 1g: Thus, B strictly dominates W at this period if ^ sN￿1 is such
that E[v(s)j^ sN￿1] > 0 and I is su¢ ciently large. Therefore, the equilibrium strategy at any
history in this period is myopic for su¢ ciently large I:
I claim whenever the equilibrium strategies at all periods after N ￿ m are myopic, the
equilibrium strategies at N ￿ m are also myopic for su¢ ciently large I: As above, the game











and B yields a strictly positive payo⁄ for all xN￿m whenever E[v(s)j^ sN￿m] > 0: On the











K ￿ xN￿m￿1+k ￿ xN￿m






where sN￿m+k(s) is the projection of s on ￿
N￿m+k
n0=1 Sn0 and 1￿(sN￿m+k(s)) is an index function
which assigns 1 when
P
s2S v(s)f(sjsN￿m+k(s)) > 0 and 0 otherwise.
Thus, W yields 0 if xN￿m ￿ K ￿ xN￿m￿1 and a strictly positive payo⁄ for xN￿m <
K ￿ xN￿m￿1: So,
U(BjxN￿m; ^ s
N￿m;x
N￿m￿1) > U(WjxN￿m; ^ s
N￿m;x
N￿m￿1)
for xN￿m ￿ K ￿ yN￿m￿1:
Since U(BjxN￿m;sN￿m;xN￿m￿1) is independent of I and U(WjxN￿m;sN￿m;xN￿m￿1) is
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I when E[v(s)j^ sN￿m] > 0: Therefore, the equilibrium strategy in any history in this period
is myopic when I is su¢ ciently large:
Therefore, by induction, for su¢ ciently large I; all equilibria are myopic. Q.E.D.
Now, Proposition 4 is proved by establishing the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Fix any ^ s = 2 S(I;K): Then, ^ s = 2 S(I0;K) for I0 > I:
I show that a necessary condition for ^ s = 2 S(I;K) is that, for histories (^ sN￿1;hN￿2) such






I ￿ xN￿2 ;1
￿
maxfv(s);0gf(sj^ s
N￿1) < E[v(s)j^ s
N￿1]: (Inequality 1)
To see this claim, suppose it is not true. Then, I can construct a symmetric mixed
equilibrium which is forward looking. Let q￿i be mixed strategies of all agents except for i.



















Thus, limq￿i!1 [U(Bj^ sN￿1;xN￿2)￿U(Wj^ sN￿1;xN￿2)] > 0: On the other hand, when q￿i = 0,



















Hence, if the inequality in the claim does not hold, then limq￿i!0 [U(Bj^ sN￿1;xN￿2) ￿
U(Wj^ sN￿1;xN￿2)] ￿ 0: Thus we can ￿nd nondegenerate behavioral strategy which consti-
tutes symmetric equilibrium by the continuity of U(:j^ sN￿1;xN￿2) with respect to q: Hence,
we have a contradiction.
Next, I show, for histories with sn such that E[v(s)jsn] > 0; if Inequality 1 holds, each
player must play B at this history.
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E[v(s)j^ sN￿1] which is constant and U(WjxN￿1; ^ sN￿1;xN￿2) is strictly decreasing in xN￿1:







Now, notice that U(WjxN￿1; ^ sN￿1;xN￿2)jxN￿1=0 = limq￿i!0 U(Wj^ sN￿1;xN￿2): Thus, In-
equality 1 guarantees U(BjxN￿1; ^ sN￿1;xN￿2) > U(WjxN￿1; ^ sN￿1;xN￿2) for all xN￿1. Hence,
for any history with ^ sN￿1 such that E[v(s)j^ sN￿1] > 0; each player must play B.
Thus, we can see that, for any history at which ^ sN￿1 is such that E[v(s)j^ sN￿1] > 0;each
player must play B at this history and thus the agent plays a myopic strategy. Since larger
I lowers only U(WjxN￿1; ^ sN￿1;xN￿2) but not U(BjxN￿1; ^ sN￿1;xN￿2); it is easy to see that,
if ^ s = 2 S(I;K); then U(Bj^ sN￿1;xN￿2) > U(Wj^ sN￿1;xN￿2) for larger I; and thus each player
must play B at this history.
We can show that this is also true for earlier periods by essentially the same argument.
Hence, by induction, ^ s = 2 S(I;K) for larger I: Q.E.D.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Let U(anj￿￿i;sn;hn￿1;t) be the expected payo⁄of type t from action an given sn;hn￿1 and
￿￿i: First, since v(s;t) is increasing in t; in any equilibrium, the strategy at period N is
monotonic: Then, let sN(t) be sN such that v(s;t) ￿ 0 for all s ￿ sN(t): Since the strategy
is monotonic at period N; sN(t0) ￿ sN(t):

















































￿i) is the probability that the demand is xn given sn;hn￿1;￿￿
￿i:
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Now, suppose the strategy is not monotonic in this period, that is, ￿i(sN￿1;hN￿2;t0)(B) >
0 and ￿i(sN￿1;hN￿2;t)(B) = 0: Then, ￿U(￿￿





￿i;sN￿1;hN￿2;t) given sN: First, observe that,










> 0; we have
￿U(￿￿
￿i;sN￿1;hN￿2;t0jsN) ￿ 0: Then, since v(s;t) is strictly increasing in t; ￿U(￿￿
￿i;sN￿1;hN￿2;tjsN) >
￿U(￿￿
￿i;sN￿1;hN￿2;t0jsN): If sN 2 fsN(t);sN(t0)g; then ￿U(￿￿
￿i;sN￿1;hN￿2;tjsN) > 0 and
￿U(￿￿
￿i;sN￿1;hN￿2;t0jsN) < 0: Thus, ￿U(￿￿
￿i;sN￿1;hN￿2;tjsN) > ￿U(￿￿
￿i;sN￿1;hN￿2;t0jsN):
If sN ￿ sN(t); then the loss that type t0 can avoid by waiting is always larger for t0 since v(s;t)





￿i;sN￿1;hN￿2;t): Therefore, any equilibrium strat-
egy at N ￿ 1 is monotonic.
Since any equilibrium strategy is monotonic at period N ￿ 1; we can apply the same ar-
gument to establish the claim for period N ￿2: Then, by induction, all equilibrium strategies
are monotonic in any period. Q.E.D.
7.3 Proposition 6
Proof. The proof consists of two parts.
Claim 1. For su¢ ciently large I; there exists myopic equilibrium.
Obviously, all agents follow myopic strategy at period N: Then, consider period N ￿ 1:
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Observe that, whenever E[v(s;t)jsN￿1;hN￿2] > 0; the expected payo⁄ from W given






arbitrarily close to 1. Thus, if U(Bj￿￿
￿i;sN￿1;hN￿2;t) > 0 and I is su¢ ciently large,
U(Wj￿￿
￿i;sN￿1;hN￿2;t) < U(Bj￿￿
￿i;sN￿1;hN￿2;t): Then, there is no incentive to deviate
from myopic strategy. The same argument holds for any period if I is su¢ ciently large.
Claim 2. For su¢ ciently large I, all equilibria are myopic.
Since all agents follow myopic strategy at period N; consider period N ￿1: Suppose type
t does not follow myopic strategy in equilibrium. Then, for some (sN￿1;hN￿2) such that
E[v(s;t)jsN￿1;hN￿2] > 0; type t plays W:
First, when some type plays B with positive probability given (sN￿1;hN￿2); the proba-




Second, suppose no type plays B at (sN￿1;hN￿2): Observe that, by choosing large I;
U(Wj￿￿
￿i;sN￿1;hN￿2;t) becomes arbitrarily small. Since the expected payo⁄from deviation,
B; is independent of I and positive, it is pro￿table to deviate when I is su¢ ciently large.
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given such (sN￿1;hN￿2) cannot be equilibrium.
Thus, any equilibrium strategy at N ￿ 1 is myopic for su¢ ciently large I=K: Then, we
can prove that any equilibrium strategy at N ￿ 2 is myopic for su¢ ciently large I=K: By
induction, the same argument holds for any period. Q.E.D.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 7




s2S1;t f(s) = 0; this is the same as
P
t2TL S1;t = ;: Thus, ￿rst, I establish the above statement when
P
t2TL S1;t = ;.






St and s1 2
[
t2TH
S1;t: Suppose all agents follow myopic
strategy. Then, as I=K goes to in￿nity, all opportunities are taken by some types in TH: On
the other hand, if all agents wait until the last period, all agents invest and opportunities
can be acquired by some types in TL: Thus, V (￿fulljs) < V (￿myojs):






St and s1 = 2
[
t2TH
S1;t: Suppose all agents follow myopic
strategy. Then, opportunities can be acquired by some types in TL: If all agents wait until
the last period, all agents invest and opportunities can be acquired by some types in TL.
Case 2-A. s 2
[
t2TH
St; s = 2
[
t2TL
St and s1 2
[
t2TH
S1;t: Suppose all agents follow myopic
strategy. Then, as I=K goes to in￿nity, all opportunities are taken by some types in TH:
If all agents wait until the last period, all opportunities are obtained by some type in TH:
Thus, as I=K goes to in￿nity, V (￿fulljs) = V (￿myojs):
Case 2-B. s 2
[
t2TH
St; s = 2
[
t2TL
St and s1 = 2
[
t2TH
S1;t: Suppose all agents follow myopic
strategy. Then, opportunities can be obtained by some types in TL. On the other hand,
if all agents wait until the last period, all opportunities are obtained by some types in TH:
Thus, V (￿fulljs) ￿ V (￿myojs):
Case 3-A. s = 2
[
t2TH
St; s = 2
[
t2TL
St and s1 2
[
t2TH
S1;t: Suppose all agents follow myopic
strategy. Then, as I=K goes to in￿nity, all opportunities are taken by some types in TH:
On the other hand, if all agents wait until the last period, no one takes any opportunities.
Thus, V (￿fulljs) > V (￿myojs):
Case 3-B. s = 2
[
t2TH
St; s = 2
[
t2TL
St and s1 = 2
[
t2TH
S1;t: Suppose all agents follow myopic
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be obtained by some types. On the other hand, if all agents wait until the last period, no
one takes any opportunity. Thus, V (￿fulljs) > V (￿myojs):













s2S1;t f(s) is su¢ ciently small. Q.E.D.
References
[1] Anderson, S, Friedman, D. Oprea, R., "Preemption games: Theory and Experiment."
Forthcoming American Economic Review.
[2] Dow, J., "Search Decisions with Limited Memory", Review of Economic Studies 58
(1991), 1-14.
[3] Fudenberg, D., Tirole,J. "Preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new tech-
nology." Review of Economic. Studies (1985),
[4] Grenadier, S., "Option Exercise Games: An Application to the Equilibrium Investment
Strategies of Firms." Review of Financial Studies, (2002)
[5] Hoppe, H., Lehmann-Grube, U. "Innovation timing games: A general framework and
applications" Journal of Economic Theory (2005)
[6] Lambrecht, B., Perraudin, W. "Real options and preemption under incomplete informa-
tion." Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, (2003)
[7] Lipman, B., "Information Processing and Bounded Rationality: Survey", The Canadian
Journal of Economics, February (1995), 42-67.
[8] Rubinstein, A., Modeling bounded rationality, MIT press, 1998
[9] Svenson, O. and Maule, J., Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and Decision
Making, Springer, (1993)
25
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 085